individual differences in analytic thinking disposition (also referred to as "analytic cognitive style") are consequential for a wide range of psychological domains over and above individual differences in cognitive ability or intelligence (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015a) .
Analytic thinking disposition is also assessed using self-report scales, such as the Need for Cognition (NC) scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; Fleischhauer et al., 2010) . According to Petty, Brinol, Loersch, and McCaslin (2009) , Need for Cognition "refers to the tendency for people to vary in the extent to which they engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive activities" (p. 318). It includes items such as "I am not very good at solving problems that require careful logical analysis" and "I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking". Thus, "effortful cognitive activities" in Petty et al.'s (2009) definition refers specifically to thinking and problem solving. Pacini and Epstein (1999) further specified the NC scale by creating subscales that distinguish between 'ability' and 'engagement'. This distinction can be seen in the two examples offered above: NC includes items that index both the self-reported ability to engage in effortful thought and the enjoyment derived therefrom. Contrast, for example, the item "I am much better at figuring out things logically than other people" (ability subscale) with the item "I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something" (engagement subscale). Thus, Pacini and Epstein's NC scale distinguishes two important components of general analytic thinking dispositions in a way that parallels performance-based measures.
NC has been used frequently in studies on information evaluation and recall, attitude formation, and judgment and decision making (see, Petty et al., 2009, for review) , along with a variety of other domains not traditionally associated with information processing. For example, high NC is associated with decreased religious and paranormal belief (Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2014; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013) , increased life satisfaction (Gauthier, Christopher, Walter, Mourad, & Marek, 2006) , decreased support for punitive responses to crime (Sargent, 2004) , and utilitarian moral judgment (Conway & Gawronski, 2013) . Indeed, Petty et al. (2009) note that over 1,000 publications have either cited the article that introduced the NC scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) or the article that introduced a shortened version of the scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984) .
Methodological implications of the Dunning-Kruger effect.
Although the NC scale has been used in hundreds of studies (Cacioppo et al., 1996; Petty et al., 2009) , research on self-report thinking disposition faces a dilemma: People who are genuinely unwilling to engage analytic thinking may not be well suited to estimate their degree of NC. Indeed, there is evidence that high NC is associated with increased levels of thinking about one's own thinking (Petty et al., 2009) . Moreover, Kruger and Dunning (1999) found that people who were in the bottom quartile in terms of logical reasoning estimated that they were just above average in terms of accuracy whereas, if anything, those in the top quartile somewhat underestimated their performance. Mata, Ferreira, and Sherman, (2013) demonstrated that relatively analytic people have a metacognitive advantage over those who rely primarily on their intuition because they are aware of both the intuitive answer and the deliberative (typically correct) response. Similar to Kruger and Dunning (1999) , found that intuitive reasoners strongly overestimate their performance relative to deliberative reasoners. Given that people's "chronic self-views" (i.e., opinion about one's abilities independent of actual performance) have been shown to influence their performance (Atir, Rosenzweig, & Dunning, 2015; Critcher & Dunning, 2009; , previous research suggests that people overestimate their performance on high-level reasoning tasks precisely because they view themselves as more reasonable than is justified by their objective performance.
Based on this research, we hypothesize that self-report thinking disposition scales are miscalibrated in a systematic way, such that those who are genuinely not analytic should overstate their relative analyticity, whereas people who are genuinely analytic should fairly accurately report their NC or perhaps even underreport it relative to others in the sample. In other words, the association between NC and objective performance should be similar to the association between estimated and objective performance: Overestimation should be largest among the most biased and the smallest (or reversed) among the least biased.
Theoretical implications of the Dunning-Kruger effect.
The Dunning-Kruger effect has important -although heretofore unspecified -theoretical implications for recent work in the field of heuristics and biases in reasoning (but see, for related empirical work). Namely, there is growing evidence that people can recognize (if implicitly) the conflict inherent in many reasoning problems (see De Neys, 2012; De Neys, 2014 for reviews). For example, consider the following item from the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005) :
A bat and ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?
Typically, around 65% of participants respond '10 cents' to this problem (e.g., Pennycook, Cheyne, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2016 ) even though it is incorrect (if the ball costs 10 cents, the bat must cost $1.10 and in total they would cost $1.20). This is thought to occur because people are cognitive misers (i.e., they conserve mental resources when possible, see Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011) and unduly rely on the first thing that comes to mind.
If the Dunning-Kruger effect applies to this type of problem, those who give incorrect intuitive responses would be unlikely to recognize their bias . Surprisingly, however, there is some evidence that even people who get this problem incorrect have some sense that there is something "off" about the problem. Namely, participants who give the incorrect intuitive response to conflict problems are less confident relative to when they answer a non-conflict version of the task (i.e., one that does not cue an incorrect intuitive response; De Neys et al., 2013); a pattern of results that remains even after participants are put under cognitive load (Johnson, Tubau, & De Neys, 2016 Bonner & Newell, 2010) .
Conflict detection during reasoning has been referred to as "omnipresent, regardless of whether participants answer problems correctly or incorrectly" (De Neys et al., 2008, p. 488) .
Indeed, there is evidence for conflict detection even among particularly biased participants using subtle low-level measures such as skin conductance (De Neys et al., 2010) . Interestingly, however, this line of research does not appear consistent with the strong evidence for the Dunning-Kruger effect. If people are good at detecting conflict during reasoning, why are the incompetent so unaware of their incompetence?
One possibility is that the low-level detection of conflicting outputs, however efficient, may not translate into changes in behavior and, ultimately, reductions in biased responding.
Indeed, recent research indicates that failures of conflict detection (which may be due to either a lack of conflict detection signal or a lack of responsiveness to a present conflict signal) are more common than previously thought (Pennycook, Fugelsang, et al., 2015b . Moreover, there is evidence that less analytic individuals are less likely to respond to conflict during reasoning (Mevel et al., 2015; Pennycook et al., 2014 Pennycook et al., , 2015b Thompson & Johnson, 2014) . Thus, metacognitive monitoring may be more effective among genuinely analytic individuals regardless of the effectiveness of conflict detection per se. This suggests that non-analytic participants should overestimate their accuracy on problems that include an intuitive, yet incorrect lure, like the bat and ball example above . More generally, the foregoing indicates that analytic individuals may be better suited to assess their relative degree of analyticity.
The current work
We report two studies in which participants completed a popular performance-based measure of analytic thinking disposition, the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005) , and were subsequently asked to estimate how many of the items they got correct Noori, 2016) . Following Kruger and Dunning (1999) , we hypothesized that participants who perform poorly on the CRT will overestimate their performance to a greater extent than those who perform well (i.e., less analytic people should be more poorly calibrated).
In addition, participants were also asked to self-report their need or desire to think analytically using the NC scale. We predicted a Dunning-Kruger effect such that participants who perform particularly poorly on the CRT (indicating an intuitive or non-analytic thinking disposition) would over-report the degree to which they are disposed to analytic thinking. In Study 2, we used an independent assessment of analytic thinking -the heuristics and biases inventory (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2014; Toplak et al., 2011) -to assess whether non-analytic individuals are genuinely worse at recognizing their bias. Put differently, participants who are decidedly nonanalytic based on the performance measure should be less suited to assess their degree of analyticity on a self-report measure, leading to poor calibration both in terms of estimated CRT accuracy and self-reported NC.
Study 1
Kruger and Dunning's (1999) primary finding was a larger difference between actual performance and estimated performance (i.e., miscalibration in the form of overestimation) for the incompetent relative to the competent. Thus, participants who perform relatively poor on the CRT should overestimate their performance and those who do relatively well should be better calibrated , which suggests that those who are genuinely nonanalytic may not be aware of their lack of analyticity.
Assuming there is good evidence for overconfidence on the estimated CRT task, we can then assess the association between this miscalibration and self-reported analytic thinking style (via the NC scale). If the tendency to overestimate CRT performance translates into a tendency to rate oneself relatively high in Need for Cognition, estimated CRT performance should predict NC over and above actual CRT performance. Similarly, the well-established association between CRT and NC (e.g., Pennycook, Cheyne, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2015) should not be evident once CRT scores have been calibrated by subtracting estimated CRT scores. Furthermore, these findings should hold for both ability and engagement subscales of the NC scale.
Method
In all studies, we report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions, and all measures. Data are available online via the Open Science Framework: https://osf.io/syfn8/.
Participants
We recruited our participants through Amazon's Mechanical Turk and chose a target N of 200 to have sufficient power (90%) to detect a moderate effect size (r = .20). We removed 14 participants because they responded affirmatively when asked if they had responded randomly at any point during the survey. We also removed a participant who had missing values for the CRT questions. Two additional participants were removed because they gave numerical answers to a CRT question that required a non-numerical response. The resulting sample (N = 183, Mean age = 33.7, SD age = 9.5) consisted of 99 males and 84 females.
Materials and Procedure
Cognitive Reflection Test. Frederick's (2005) original CRT consisted of 3 math problems that reliably cue intuitive but incorrect answers. The test is considered an index of analytic thinking disposition because the items require the participant to question a compelling intuitive response -a process that requires a willingness to think analytically (Pennycook & Ross, 2016; Travers, Rolison, & Feeney, 2016) . Since the original CRT has been used extensively on Mechanical Turk, we used two recently developed tests that were designed to measure the same underlying construct instead of the original measure. Specifically, we used Toplak, West, and Stanovich's (2014) 4-item CRT and Thomson and Oppenheimer's (2016) 4-item CRT. The number of correct responses for the two CRTs were significantly correlated, r(183) = .336, p < .001, and combined to make a scale with acceptable reliability, α = .70. The eight CRT items were presented one at time and in a random order for each participant. After completing all CRT items, we asked participants to estimate the number of CRT questions that they answered correctly.
Need for Cognition. Participants then completed Pacini and Epstein's (1999) 20-item
Need for Cognition scale. Pacini and Epstein's NC scale consists of 'ability' and 'engagement' subscales, which were treated as separate scales for present purposes. Items were presented in a randomized order and participants responded on a scale from "1) Definitely not true of myself" to "5) Definitely true of myself". Both Ability (NC-A) and Engagement (NC-E) subscales had excellent reliability, α's = .90, .95 (for NC-A and NC-E, respectively). The full NC scale was also reliable, α = .95
Results and Discussion

Dunning-Kruger effects in estimated CRT performance
As predicted, participants overestimated their total accuracy on the eight CRT items. On average, participants estimated that they correctly solved 5.59 CRT problems (SD = 1.52), but mean performance was only 3.88 (SD = 2.11), t(182) = 11.14, SE = .15, p < .001, d = .82. The correlation between estimated and actual CRT performance was modest, r(183) = -.379, p < .001, such that actual CRT performance only explains 14.4% of the variance in estimated CRT performance. Following Kruger and Dunning (1999) , we split the sample into groups, based on accuracy, to test whether those who did poorly on the CRT were more strongly miscalibrated than those who did better. Although there are only 9 possible scores on the 8-item CRT and, in theory, we could use 9 different groups, only a small number of participants scored 0 (N = 4, 2.2% of the sample) or 8 (N = 8, 4.4% of the sample). Thus, we increased the N in each CRT group by combining across accuracy scores and creating four groups (0-2, 3-4, 5-6, 7-8).
Using a mixed design ANOVA, there was an interaction between CRT group and the difference between actual CRT score and estimated CRT score (see Figure 1) , F(3, 179) = 56.24, MSE = 1.13, p < .001, ƞ 2 = .49. As is evident from Figure 1 , overestimation decreases (i.e., calibration increases) systematically as accuracy increases. To compare rates of calibration across CRT categories, we computed a difference score between estimated and actual CRT and compared it across the levels of CRT performance (based on our 4 groups). A post hoc Tukey HSD test comparing the difference between estimated and actual CRT performance (i.e., calibration) indicated that each of the four groups emerged as separate homogeneous subsets (p < .05). Notably, those who scored very low on the CRT (0-2, M = 1.42, 17.8% accuracy) estimated that they answered 4.78 questions correctly (59.8% accuracy) -that is, they overestimated by a factor of 3.4. Those who correctly answered 3-4 of the CRT problems overestimated by a factor of 1.7, whereas those who answered 5-6 problems correctly only overestimated by a factor of 1.1 (see Figure 1 ).
In contrast, and similar to Kruger and Dunning (1999) , we found that those who scored 7- 
Association between overconfidence and Need for Cognition
If the NC scale is a good measure of actual analytic thinking disposition, it should correlate more strongly with actual CRT performance than estimated performance. However, if anything, estimated CRT performance was more strongly correlated with NC, r(183) = .307, p < If the tendency to overestimate CRT performance is linked with the tendency to rate oneself relatively high on the NC scale, estimated CRT should predict NC over and above actual CRT performance. We therefore entered both accuracy and estimated accuracy (along with their interaction) as predictors in two regression analyses with NC-A and NC-E as the dependent variables (see Table 1 ). Not only did estimated CRT accuracy significantly predict self-reported NC-A and NC-E once actual CRT scores were taken into account, but actual CRT accuracy was not a robust predictor once estimated accuracy was taken into account. There was also an interaction between estimated accuracy and actual accuracy for both NC subscales. This interaction emerged because estimated CRT accuracy was more strongly positively correlated with NC for those who did well on the CRT (see Figure S1 in supplementary materials). These results indicate a link between miscalibration in analytic thinking and self-reported Need for
Cognition. As a follow-up analysis, we created a calibration score by taking the difference between estimated and actual CRT. This calibration score was not significantly correlated with NC-A, r(183) = -.012, p = .871, or NC-E, r(183) = .051, p = .491. This, again, indicates that selfreport NC is as much a measure of estimated CRT performance as it is a measure of actual CRT performance. 
Study 2
In Study 1, those who were prone to errors on the CRT were more likely to overestimate their performance -a Dunning-Kruger effect. Moreover, consistent with previous research in other domains (Atir et al., 2015; Critcher & Dunning, 2009; ,
estimates of CRT accuracy were as predictive of self-reported analytic thinking disposition as was actual CRT accuracy. These findings suggest that self-report measures of thinking disposition may lack precision. Overconfidence among those genuinely low in analytic thinking may translate into overestimates of self-report analytic thinking whereas proper calibration (or, if
anything, under-confidence) among those genuinely high in analytic thinking may translate into relative underestimates of self-report analytic thinking. In other words, it may be the case that those who rely on their intuition are not analytic enough to know that they are not analytic whereas analytic people are analytic enough to know the limits of their analyticity.
Although the results of Study 1 were consistent with the proposed Dunning-Kruger effect in self-reported thinking disposition, the evidence was indirect. Specifically, the same performance-based analytic thinking disposition measure, the CRT, was used to make inferences about miscalibration for both estimated CRT score and self-reported NC. To overcome this limitation, we included a separate measure of analytic thinking: the heuristics and biases inventory (H&B; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011) . Having a second performance-based ('objective') measure of analytic thinking will allow us to more directly test the hypothesis that NC scores are systematically miscalibrated. That is, the difference between actual and estimated CRT performance (calibration) should be associated with objective H&B performance, but not self-reported NC. This would illustrate a correspondence between objective measures of analytic thinking even after miscalibration has been taken into account. There should be no likewise correspondence with self-report NC because, presumably, this miscalibration also affects people's perception of their analytic thinking disposition.
Including a second objective measure of analytic thinking will also allow us to compare relative performance on our two analytic thinking benchmarks (CRT and H&B) with relative self-reported Need for Cognition by creating a number of additional calibration scores.
Individuals who are not particularly analytic (based on relative CRT and H&B score) should nonetheless rate themselves as relatively analytic (based on self-reported NC). We predict that the difference between relative CRT performance and self-reported NC will correlate positively with H&B performance (and, likewise, the difference between H&B and NC will correlate with CRT). In other words, there should be miscalibration between NC and our objective measures of analytic thinking in the same way that there is miscalibration between estimated and actual CRT scores. This would be akin to a Dunning-Kruger effect in self-reported analytic thinking disposition. As in Study 1, this should be evident for both ability and engagement subscales of the NC scale.
Method
Data are available online via the Open Science Framework: https://osf.io/z6trc/.
Participants
In total, 400 participants were recruited from Mechanical Turk 1 . We removed 56 participants because they responded affirmatively when asked if they had responded randomly at any point during the survey and 3 participants who had missing data for the CRT. The resulting sample (N = 341, Mean age = 33.9, SD age = 10.5) consisted of 200 males and 139 females.
Materials and Procedure
Cognitive Reflection Test. The CRT was administered as in Study 1. The two CRT scales were significantly correlated, r(341) = .362, p < .001, but the scale had weaker reliability than in Study 1, α = .65. One participant estimated that they solved 9 out of 8 CRT problems correctly, so we changed the value to 8.
Heuristics and biases battery.
As an independent measure of analytic thinking, we used Need for Cognition. The NC scale was administered as in Study 1, except in this case it followed the heuristics and biases battery and was presented before a paranormal belief scale (which will not be considered further, see supplementary materials). One participant had an outlying NC score (3 SD below the mean) -subsequent analyses are reported with the outlier 1 We originally collected data for 200 participants using the same stopping rule as in Study 1. However, upon completing data collection for the first 200 participants in this study, an error in the CRT estimate question was discovered (which also applied to Study 1). Specifically, participants were told to input a number between 1 and 8 instead of between 0 and 8. We therefore re-ran Study 2 with the corrected instructions. Fortunately, only one participant guessed that they got 0 out of 8 correct when given the corrected instructions (no participants indicated 0 in Study 1 or the first run of Study 2). Estimated CRT performance was identical regardless of whether participants were told to enter a number from 1 to 8 or 0 to 8, t(339) = .04, p = .971. Thus, we report the data for the full set of 400 participants below.
removed, although the pattern of results was identical. The subscales were reliable, α = .89, .94
for NC-A and NC-E, respectively. 
Results and Discussion
Dunning-Kruger effects in estimated CRT
Association between overconfidence and Need for Cognition
Here we will replicate the associations between estimated and actual CRT performance and NC. Correlations among primary variables can be found in Table 2 . As in Study 1, the correlation between NC and actual CRT performance were not significantly different (although in this case, nominally larger for NC-E) to the correlation between NC and estimated CRT performance, t < 1 2 . To estimate the extent to which actual CRT accuracy and estimated CRT accuracy predict NC, we entered both variables (along with their interaction) as predictors in two regression analyses with NC-A and NC-E as a dependent variables (see Table 3 ). Unlike in Study 1, both actual and estimated CRT accuracy (along with their interaction, see Figure S3 in supplementary materials) significantly independently predicted NC-A and only actual CRT significantly predicted NC-E. These independent associations were relatively modest, however;
β's ranged from .120-181. Table 3 Final step of a hierarchical multiple regression analysis predicting self-reported Need for Cognition with estimated CRT accuracy (CRT Est), actual CRT accuracy (CRT Acc), and their interaction (Acc x Est) as predictors. The top panel is the ability subscale (NC-A) and the bottom panel is the engagement subscale (NC-E). N = 341. As in Study 1, neither NC-A or NC-E were associated with the difference between actual and estimated CRT performance, r's < .085, p's > .130 (Calibration1; see Table 2 ). In contrast, H&B performance did positively associate with Calibration1, r(341) = .148, p = .006. Thus, there was a correspondence between objective measures of analytic thinking (CRT and H&B) even after miscalibration (CRT estimates) have been taken into account. This pattern of results was not evident for self-reported NC because, presumably, the miscalibration that is reflected in estimated CRT performance also affects people's perception of their analytic thinking disposition.
Dunning-Kruger effects in self-reported Need for Cognition
To further test the hypothesis that participants who are genuinely low in analytic thinking over-report their NC, we created three additional calibration scores. We did this by converting CRT, H&B, and NC raw scores into z-scores and computed their difference scores ( Table 2) .
The conversion to z-scores allows us to compare participants' relative position on the three ostensibly linked measures. The goal is to treat self-reported NC in the same way as estimated CRT scores. For this analysis, we decreased the number of comparisons by focusing on the ability subscale (NC-A), which more directly relates to people's assessments of their analytic thinking disposition (as opposed to mere enjoyment of analytic thinking) 3 .
If NC-A is miscalibrated in the same way as estimated CRT scores, as we have predicted, there should be a correspondence between the parallel estimate-based and NC-based calibration scores. Indeed, the difference between the z-scores for CRT accuracy and NC-A correlated positively with H&B performance ('Calibration2'; Table 2 The results are nonetheless essentially identical when NC-E is used in place of NC-A. Specifically, the difference between the z-scores for CRT accuracy and NC-E correlated positively with H&B performance (akin to 'Calibration2' in Table 2 ), r(341) = .176, p = .001. The difference between the z-scores for H&B accuracy and NC-E correlated positively with CRT performance (akin to 'Calibration3' in To illustrate the source of the Dunning-Kruger effect on self-reported NC, we will focus on the parallel between two independent patterns of results : 1 H&B Accuracy NC-A Self-Report NC-E Self-Report additional performance-based measure of analytic thinking -the heuristics and biases battery (H&B) -revealed a systematic miscalibration on self-reported NC wherein relatively intuitive individuals report that they are more analytic than is justified by their objective performance.
Together, these findings indicate that participants who are low in analytic thinking (so-called "intuitive thinkers") are at least somewhat unaware of (or unresponsive to) their propensity to rely on intuition in lieu of analytic thought during decision making. This conclusion is consistent with previous research that suggests that the propensity to think analytically facilitates metacognitive monitoring during reasoning (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015b; Thompson & Johnson, 2014) . Those who are genuinely analytic are aware of the strengths and weaknesses of their reasoning, whereas those who are genuinely non-analytic are perhaps best described as "happy fools" (De Neys et al., 2013) .
This research has both methodological and theoretical implications. With respect to methodological implications, self-report measures of thinking disposition such as the NC scale have been used in hundreds of studies (Cacioppo et al., 1996; Petty et al., 2009) . Nonetheless, correlations with NC are often modest. In the current work, for example, correlations (Pearson's r) between performance-based measures of analytic thinking and the 'ability' and 'engagement' NC subscales ranged from .190 to .242. Given the evidence for systematic miscalibration among genuinely non-analytic individuals, we suggest that the predictive power of analytic thinking dispositions may have been underestimated in research that has focused on self-report measures.
Future research should continue to explore whether performance-based measures of analytic thinking yield stronger associations than self-report measures.
In terms of theoretical implications, there has been a recent surge in metacognitive perspectives in the realm of dual-process theory. For example, Thompson and colleagues (Thompson et al., 2011 (Thompson et al., , 2013 have provided evidence that 'feelings of rightness' are predictive of the extent and quality of analytic thinking. There is also evidence from verbal protocols that conflict detection is often implicit (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008) and it seems likely that it may only become explicit upon further reflection via analytic processing. Thus, given that analytic thinking relies (to some extent) on volitional control, the presence of a signal to think analytically does not guarantee that the individual will engage in more than cursory levels of analytic thought. This line of reasoning is supported by both the present findings and previous work showing that the propensity to think analytically correlates with increases in response time for biased responses to incongruent (conflict) base-rate problems (Pennycook et al., 2014; Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015b) . That is, more analytic individuals engaged in more substantive analytic thinking even in cases where they ultimately rationalized their initial ('biased') response. Collectively, these findings reveal pervasive differences between intuitive and analytic individuals at various levels of cognitive functioning.
The present results are also unique in the sense that they illustrate the everyday consequences of metacognitive differences as a function of analytic thinking. Namely, less analytic people are not only less effective at metacognitive monitoring when given a reasoning task, but they may also be less accurate at self-reporting their relative level of analytic thinking.
It may be the case that this metacognitive advantage for analytic individuals may be part of the reason why analytic thinking is associated with a wide range of important psychological factors such as morality, religiosity, and creativity (see Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015a ).
Thinking about how one thinks may influence how and what people think about. Indeed, our results suggest that part of the reason why debates in areas such as politics are so futile is because those for which overconfidence is the most consequential (i.e., those who need the most correcting, due to their low level of analyticity) are the least likely to recognize their overconfidence. Those most likely to be biased are also the least likely to recognize their bias.
